Traditional point-to-point message authentication systems have been extensively studied in the literature. In this paper, we consider authentication systems for group communication. The basic primitive is a multireceiver authentication system with dynamic senders (DMRA-code). In a DMRA-code any member of the group can broadcast an authenticated message to the rest of the group such that every other member of the group can individually verify the authenticity of the message. We give a exible 'synthesis' construction for DMRA-codes by combining an A-code and a key distribution pattern. tDMRA-codes extend this model when there are up to t senders. We give two constructions, one algebraic and one by 'synthesis' of an A-code and a perfect hash family. We show universality of 'synthesis' constructions for unconditional and computational models of security which means that our results have wider range applications. Finally, to demonstrate the usefulness of DMRA model, we modify a secure dynamic conferencekey distribution system to construct a secure dynamic conference system that provides secrecy and authenticity of communication among conferencees. The system is key-e cient as its key requirement remains nearly the same as the original conference key distribution system and so authentication is e ectively obtained without any extra cost. We discuss possible extensions to this work.
Introduction
Collaborative and multi-user applications, such as teleconferences and electronic commerce applications, require secure communication among members of a group. Ensuring integrity and authenticity of information is independent from providing 1 Part of this work was carried out when the author was with the National University of Singapore.
E-mail addresses: rei@uow.edu.au (R. Safavi-Naini), huaxiong@uow.wde.au (H. Wang).
conÿdentiality and an authenticated messages might be in plaintext form readable by public. We consider the following scenario. There is a set of users and a trusted authority (TA). During the initialization of the system, the TA generates keys for all users and securely gives the keys to them. Later, any user can broadcast a message whose origin and content is individually veriÿable by every other user. We assume that users are not all trusted and may collude to construct a fraudulent message, to be attributed to another user. We assume security is unconditional and does not rely on any computational assumption.
The obvious method of providing protection in the above system is to use a conventional point-to-point authentication system and give a shared key to each pair of users. Now to construct an authenticated message, a user will construct a separate authenticator for every other user, concatenate them together and append the result to the message. This will allow a receiver to individually verify the authenticity of the message by verifying the authenticator constructed using his shared key. An immediate drawback of such a system is that it requires a very large key storage, and produces a very long tag for a message, resulting in high communication cost.
Multireceiver authentication systems (MRA-codes) [11] are the ÿrst attempt to model and construct systems that provide authentication in group communication. However, in this model the sender is ÿxed. In [25] this limitation is removed and any group member is allowed to be the sender. The extended model is called MRA-code with dynamic sender, or DMRA-codes for short. DMRA-codes capture the essential properties of authentication systems for group communication but the model is restricted and allows only one message to be sent. However, in many applications such as dynamic conference key distributions, group members interact with each other and more than one sender exists. Moreover, the only known non-trivial construction of MRA-codes [25, 27] is very in exible and for large size groups, or large size sources, results in very ine cient constructions with many key bits and long authenticators. In summary, although DMRA-codes do provide a promising model for authentication in group communication, for practical applications more general, exible and e cient constructions are required.
Our goal is to have solutions that are e cient both in terms of storage and communication cost. To achieve this goal we will have two assumptions.
• The largest size of collusion set is w.
• There are at most t transmitters (senders).
The ÿrst assumption e ectively bounds the power of attackers, and the second one is a more complex version of the degree of spooÿng in a conventional authentication system. This is because in a spooÿng of order t attack in an A-code, the enemy has access to t previous messages sent by the same transmitter and wants to construct a fraudulent codeword. In group authentication systems we allow senders of messages to be di erent and so a new type of attack, that is changing the originator of a message, must be taken into account. The attack uses the fact that in many applications such as a voting system with many participants and only a 'yes' or 'no' answer, the same message will be sent by more than one sender. The attack suggests that in a DMRA-code with multiple dynamic senders, an authenticated message must carry some information about its origin.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. 1. We extend the model of DMRA-codes proposed in [25] , to allow more than one sender and give a formal deÿnition for such systems. 2. We propose a general 'synthesis' construction for DMRA-codes by combining a key distribution pattern (KDP) [22] and an A-code, such that the protection of the resulting system can be determined by the protection of the A-code and parameters of the KDP. The construction is especially attractive as it reduces the construction of DMRA-codes to the construction of suitable KDPs and A-codes and allows direct application of the known results in these areas to the construction of DMRA-codes. 3. We consider a DMRA-code with t senders, tDMRA-code for short, and give two new constructions for such codes. The ÿrst construction is algebraic and uses polynomials in two variables using an approach similar to the optimal construction for single-sender scheme. The second construction is a 'synthesis' construction which is combinatorial in nature and combines a perfect hash family and an arbitrary Acode to obtain a tDMRA-code. The construction has the generality and exibility that we noted earlier in the 'synthesis' construction of DMRA-codes from KDP and A-codes. 4. To show the usefulness of our results, we apply DMRA-codes to the construction of secure dynamic conference system. Security means that messages from a conference is only readable, and veriÿable for its authenticity, by other conference members. We note that a secure conference key distribution protocol can be used to provide conÿdentiality for conference members but the origin of messages cannot be determined and the system does not provide any accountability. Our construction uses an optimal dynamic conference key distribution system proposed in [8] , and for large group sizes, as long as the conference size is relatively small, e ectively adds authentication without any extra cost (extra key bits). 5. Although our main analysis is for Cartesian A-codes with unconditional security but our main constructions are universal. That is they can also be used for Acodes with secrecy and Message Authentication Codes (MAC), resulting in systems in which protection is determined by the security property of the underlying authentication system (A-code with or without secrecy, or MAC) and parameters of the combinatorial structure, a KDP or a perfect hash family. This means that a primitive authentication system can be used for e cient authentication in large groups. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and give the deÿnitions. In Section 3 we brie y review previous results for DMRA-codes and then propose an e cient construction using key distribution patterns and conventional A-codes. In Section 4 we consider systems with multiple senders and present two constructions. In Section 5 we propose a secure dynamic conference system and conclude the paper in Section 6 by discussing computationally secure systems and proposing possible extensions of this work. Results in this paper were in part presented at Asiacrypt'99.
The model

Conventional A-codes
In a conventional authentication system (A-system) [28] a sender wants to send a message over a public channel to a receiver in the presence of an active spoofer who can insert a message into the channel (impersonation attack), or observe a transmitted message and then replace it with a fraudulent one (substitution attack). To provide protection against a spoofer's attack, the sender and receiver use an authentication code (A-code), which is a collection of transformations from the set of source states, S, to the set of codewords, M . In A-codes without secrecy, also called Cartesian A-codes, a codeword determines a unique source state. In a systematic Cartesian A-code a codeword for a message s is of the form (s; a), where a ∈ A is called authenticator or tag. Sender and receiver share a key e ∈ E which determines the authentication function, e() : S → A, used to generate the authenticator a = e(s), for a source state s. An authenticated message generated by the sender is equal to (s; e(s)) ∈ M . The receiver will detect a fraudulent message (s; t) if t = e(s). We will write an A-code as C = (S; M; E) (or C = (S; A; E) for a systematic Cartesian A-code), and denote the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks by P I and P S , respectively. We also denote the overall deception probability of an A-code by P D = max{P I ; P S }.
DMRA-codes
A (w; n) MRA-code [11] is an extension of the classical A-systems where a ÿxed sender can authenticate a single message for a group of n receivers such that collusions of up to w receivers cannot construct a fraudulent codeword which is accepted by another receiver. Bounds and construction for MRA-codes are given in [16, 18, 25] .
An extension of the MRA-code model is when the sender is not ÿxed and can be any member of the group. The system is called an MRA-code with dynamic sender. Allowing the sender to be dynamic introduces a new type of attack in which the intruder changes the origin information of a message sent by P j and resends it with the aim of attributing it to P i . This attack could have a high success chance if P i and P j share key information. This means that schemes that establish a common key among two or more users, including the scheme described in Section 1, the construction based on symmetric polynomial [25] or KDP and its more general form (i; j)-cover-free family [31] cannot be used for key distribution.
To protect against the above attack the origin of a broadcasted message must be included in the message and authentication will be with respect to a particular originator. This can be done by (1) attaching identity information to the message and then authenticating the resulting message, or (2) appending the origin information to the authenticated message. The ÿrst approach will e ectively increase the size of the message space to be authenticated and in the case of a small source and a large group of users such as the voting system above, is not acceptable. We will show that this information is theoretically redundant and can be removed in an optimal system. In this paper we assume the second approach.
An attacker succeeds by either changing the origin, or the message, and hence the system must provide both origin (entity) authentication and message authentication. To verify the authenticity of a received message the receiver must ÿrst assume an originator for the message and then verify the message with respect to that originator.
In the model of MRA-code with dynamic senders, there are n users P = {P 1 ; : : : ; P n }, who want to communicate over a broadcast channel. The channel is subject to spooÿng attack: that is a codeword can be inserted into the channel or, a transmitted codeword can be substituted with a fraudulent one. An attack is directed towards a channel, consisting of a pair of users {P i ; P j }, P i being the sender and P j being the receiver. A spoofer might be an outsider, or a coalition of w insiders. The aim of the spoofer(s) is to construct a codeword that P j accepts as authentic and being sent from P i .
A TA generates secret keys for users and securely distributes them. The TA is only active during key distribution phase. The system consists of three phases. 1. Key Distribution: The TA randomly chooses a key e ∈ E and uses a key distribution algorithm
(e) = (e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) to generate a key e i and secretly sends e i to P i , for all 16i6n. 2. Broadcast: A user P i constructs an authenticated message and broadcasts it. For this, P i uses an authentication algorithm,
where E i and M i are the set of keys and authenticated codewords, respectively, for P i . The codeword sent by P i for a source state s ∈ S is (i; A i (s; e i )) = (i; m i ). 3. Veriÿcation: A user P j , where 16j6n, uses a veriÿcation algorithm V ji to accept or reject the received codeword. That is, user P j has a set of veriÿcation algorithms {V ji ; 16i6n; j = i} with
such that V ji (m i ; e j ) = 1 if P j accepts m i as an authenticated codeword received from P i , and V ji (m i ; e j ) = 0, otherwise. We will denote the code described above as C = (S; E; {A i ; E i } 16i6n ) and call C a MRA-code with dynamic sender(s) (or DMRA-code for short). We assume that after the key-distribution phase, there are at most t users who will broadcast authenticated messages, where all messages come from a set S of source states. For simplicity, we also assume that each sender may only broadcast a single message. We will adopt the Kerckho 's principle that details of the system, except the actual keys, are public. To assess security, we deÿne the probability of success in various attacks. Let w denote the largest size of the collusion set, and B and A be two subsets of {1; : : : ; n} with |B| = ÿ6t and |A| = 6w. Without loss of generality, let B = {k 1 ; : : : ; k ÿ } and A = {' 1 ; : : : ; ' }, and denote P B = {P k1 ; : : : ; P k ÿ } and P A = {P '1 ; : : : ; P ' }. Assume that after seeing ÿ authenticated messages (s k1 ; a k1 ); : : : ; (s k ÿ ; a k ÿ ) broadcasted by P k1 ; : : : ; P k ÿ , respectively, (s k1 ; : : : ; s k ÿ are not necessarily distinct), P A wants to generate a message (s i ; a i ) such that it will be accepted by P j as an authenticated message broadcasted by P i . We further assume that i; j ∈ A.
2 Let P[m; P A ; P B ; P i ; P j ] denote the probability of success for malicious users in P A in using a message m as broadcasted by P i , after the broadcasted messages from P B are seen. We assume malicious users use their optimal strategy that maximizes their chance of success. They can choose the message m and the channel, that is P i , P j , to achieve this goal.
It is easy to see that if A ⊂ A , then P[m; P A ; P B ; P i ; P j ]6P[m; P A ; P B ; P i ; P j ]. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that |A| = w. For each 06k6t, we deÿne where the maximum is taken over all possible m; A; B; i; j such that |A| = w, |B| = k and i; j = ∈ A. We then deÿne the overall probability of deception, denoted by P D , as P D = max{P D0 ; P D1 ; : : : ; P Dt }:
DMRA-codes with a single sender
We start with the simplest (w; n) tDMRA-code in which t = 1 and simply call it a (w; n) DMRA-code. This is exactly the same model as MRA-code with dynamic sender introduced in [25] . In Section 3.1 we review combinatorial lower bounds on the key sizes of users and the length of the authenticators, and the optimal construction 2 There are other possible attacks for the case i ∈ A or j ∈ A. For example, a user claims to have received a message from another user when it was never sent, or after a message is broadcasted, the sender denies having sent it. To avoid these attacks in conventional A-codes, a new participant, called an arbiter, is introduced who in the case of a dispute arbitrates between the transmitter and the receiver. The resulting A-code is called A-code with arbiter, or A 2 -code. A similar approach can be considered for DMRA-codes with dynamic senders.
that meets these bounds given in [27] . In Section 3.2 we will give a new 'synthesis' construction from key distribution patterns.
Bounds and an optimal construction
E ciency of a (w; n) DMRA-code C = (S; E; {M i ; E i } 16i6n ), can be measured in terms of the size of users' key spaces, |E i |'s, and the length of the authenticated messages, |M i |'s. We do not really need to consider the key size of the TA, |E|, as after the key distribution phase the TA does not need to save the keys. The following lower bounds can be used to determine the best performance of a DMRA-code.
Theorem 3.1 (Safari-Naini & Wang [27] ). In a (w; n) DMRA-code C = (S; E; {M i ; E i } 16i6n ) with P D 61=q and uniform probability distribution on the source S; we have (i) |E i |¿q 2(w+1) ; for each i ∈ {1; 2; : : : ; n}; (ii) |M i |¿q w+1 |S|; for each i ∈ {1; 2; : : : ; n}:
The bounds are tight [27] and a system that meets the bounds can be obtained by a slight modiÿcation of the scheme proposed in [25] . This scheme uses symmetric polynomials in two variables over GF(q) (similar to Blom's key distribution scheme [7] ) and works as follows. Let S be the set of source states and q¿ max{|S|; n} be a prime power. First, the TA randomly chooses two symmetric polynomials F(x; y) and G(x; y) with coe cients in GF(q) and of degree at most w. Then he gives (f i (x); g i (x)), where f i (x) = F(x; i) and g i (x) = G(x; i), to user P i . This constitutes the secret key of P i , 16i6n. When a user P i wants to authenticate a source state s ∈ S, he computes the polynomial A i (x) = f i (x) + sg i (x) and broadcasts (s; A i (x)) together with his identity i to all other users. User P j will accept (s; A i (x)) as authentic and being sent from P i if and only if A i (j) = f j (i) + sg j (i). It is proved [27] that this construction results in a (w; n) DMRA-code with P D = 1=q, |E i | = q 2w and |M i | = q w |S|, 16i6n, and so the bounds in Theorem 3.1 are met.
The above construction, although optimal, is very restrictive as q determines not only the deception probability but also the size of the key space and the length of the tag. More speciÿcally, for P D = 1=q the key size and the authenticator length for users are both of order O(log q). This means that for large size sources, and=or large size groups, the construction requires high values for q and results in unnecessarily low value for P D at the expense of large key spaces, and long authenticators for users.
A general construction
In the following we show a general construction for (w; n) DMRA-codes by combining a key-distribution pattern and an A-code such that the security of the resulting system is determined by the security of the underlying A-code and the parameters of the key-distribution pattern. The importance of this construction is that it provides a much higher degree of exibility in the design of DMRA-codes and results in constructions that are of practical interest. The construction can be seen as an extension of a construction in [25] , replacing the cover-free family with a KDP.
Key distribution patterns (KDP) [22] are explicitly or implicitly used by numerous authors to construct key-distribution systems ( [12, 17, 20, 23, 24, 30, 31] ).
Let X = {x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x v } be a set and let B = {B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B n } be a family of subsets of X . The set system (X; B) is called an (n; v; w) key-distribution pattern (or KDP(n; v; w) for short) if
for any w + 2 subset {i; j; ' 1 ; : : : ; ' w } of {1; 2; : : : ; n}.
Assume there are n users P 1 ; : : : ; P n . Let (X; B) be a KDP(n; v; w) and (S; A 0 ; E 0 ) denote a Cartesian A-code with P D 61=q. Both (X; B) and (S; A 0 ; E 0 ) are public. Associate B i to P i , 16i6n. 1. Key distribution: For each 16j6v; the TA randomly chooses an authentication key e j ∈ E 0 and gives e j to user P i if x j ∈ B i . Thus, user P i receives a |B i |-tuple, (e i1 ; : : : ; e i |B i | ) ∈ E |Bi| 0 , as his=her secret authentication key. 2. Broadcast: When P i wants to construct an authenticated message for a source state s ∈ S, he computes |B i | partial authenticators e i ' (s), 16'6|B i |, and broadcasts (i; s; e i1 (s); : : : ; e i |B i | (s)). 3. Veriÿcation: A user can verify the authenticity and origin of a broadcasted message, (i; s; a i1 ; : : : ; a i |B i | ), in the following way: P j uses the origin information, i, to determine the set E ij = {e i ' } 16'6|Bi| ∩ {e j k } 16k6|Bj| and accepts the message as authentic and sent from P i if a iu = e iu (s) for all e iu ∈ E ij . Theorem 3.2. Consider an A-code (S; A 0 ; E 0 ) with deception probability P D 61=q. Then the above construction results in a (w; n) DMRA-code C = (S; E; {A i ; E i } 16i6n ) with P D 61=q. The code has the following parameters:
Proof. Assume there are w colluding users, P 1 ; : : : ; P w , who see a broadcasted message and want to construct a fraudulent one to be accepted by P j and attributed to P i . Since
, it follows that there exists at least one key e ij ∈ E 0 that is known to P i and P j , but is unknown to P 1 ; : : : ; P w . Because of the properties of the underlying A-code, the success probability of colluders in constructing a fraudulent message is not better than the success chance of an outside enemy in the A-code and is bounded by 1=q.
The construction also works for general A-codes in which case the broadcasted codeword by P i is (m i1 · · · m i |B i | ) where m ij = e ij (s). However, the main advantage of the construction is its exibility in the choice of parameters. The following example illustrates the ideas and shows the e ectiveness of the above construction. 19 . This is acceptable for most practical purposes. We use an A-code that provides enough protection, and a KDP with n = 5000 and w = 5. For example we employ the A-code constructed from universal hashing families in [4] with the following parameters: |S| = 2 2 50 , authenticator length 20 bits, and the key length 125 bits. Using a probabilistic method developed in [12] , we will obtain a KDP(n; v; w) with n = 5000; v = 3928, w = 5 having an average block size, |B i | = 1123, 16i6n. We obtain a (5; 5000)-DMRA code with the following parameters.
-The key storages for the TA and each user are 591 and 140 Kbits, respectively; -The length of the authenticator is 2:5 Kbits; -P D 6 1 2 19 . Compared to the optimal construction the key storage and the communication cost are dramatically reduced while the deception probability has increased from 1 2 2 50 to 1 2 19 which is considered adequate security level for practical applications.
This construction is especially useful in practical applications where secure key storage and communication bandwidth are scarce and valuable resources.
To obtain key e cient constructions from Theorem 3.2 we require a KDP(n; v; w) with small v. The trivial key distribution KDP(n; v; w) with w6n−2 has B equal to the collection of pairs of X , and so n = v(v−1)=2 and |B i | = v−1 for all 16i6n. A 'good' KDP(n; v; w), is one that for given v and w, n and |B i | are as small as possible for 16i6n. The constructions in [22, 17] both require v = O(n) which is much better than the trivial construction with v = O(n 2 ). Dyer et al. [12] gave a probabilistic construction with v = O(log n), but explicit constructions having v = O(log n) are believed to be hard. From [31] we know explicit constructions where v is a polynomial function of log n exist.
It is worth noting that the construction based on KDPs can only result in 'good' DMRA-codes (small v) if w is small compared to n. This is because of the relationship between KDPs and cover-free families and the known bounds on the latter. More speciÿcally, (X; F), where X is a point set and F is a family of subsets of X with |X | = v and |F| = n, is called an (n; v; w)-cover-free family if F k0 ⊂F k1 ∪ · · · ∪ F kw holds for all F k0 ; F k1 ; : : : ; F kw ∈ F, where F i = F j if i = j. A KDP(n; v; w) (X; B) gives an (n − 1; |B i |; w)-cover-free family by considering B i as the point set and {B i ∩ B j ; j = 1; 2; : : : ; n and j = i} as F. The proof of this claim is straightforward and is omitted. Erd os et al in [14] (Proposition 3:4) showed that in any (n; v; w)-cover-free family with n¿v, we have ( w+2 This means that the size of the block in the original KDP must be more than the trivial scheme and so is not possible.
DMRA-codes with multiple senders
In this section we consider tDMRA-codes, with t¿2. In designing a (w; n) tDMRAcode with t¿2, it is important to note that if the protection for a channel between two participants P i and P j is provided by a symmetric key system, then a message sent by P i can be later resent and attributed to P j . In this case P i will accept the message as authentic from P j and the success chance of the intruder is 1. To avoid this directional attack, P i and P j must have di erent keys.
In the following we ÿrst look at two simple approaches to the construction of a tDMRA-code and then give two more e cient constructions and assess their security.
Trivial Construction 1. An obvious method of constructing a tDMRA-code is to use t copies of a DMRA-code with t independent keys. That is, in the key generation phase the TA chooses t independent keys, e 1 ; e 2 ; : : : ; e t , for a DMRA-code with a single sender and gives user P i the t tuple, (e 1 i ; e 2 i ; : : : ; e t i ). P i will use key e ' i to authenticate (generate or verify) the 'th message. In this case the size of the key for each participant is t times that of a DMRA-code, which for e cient DMRA-codes and small t could be reasonably low. The length of the tag for each message is the same as the original DMRA-code. However the system requires each user to carefully keep track of all the communicated messages and their corresponding keys.
Trivial Construction 2. A second immediate solution is to use a (w; n−1) MRA-code. In this case each user receives the key information for sending one message and verifying n−1 messages. The result is a (w; t) tDMRA-code with t = n. The length of the tag in this case is the same as the MRA-code but the key storage is at least a linear function of n and so will be prohibitive for large groups.
A polynomial construction for tDMRA-codes
The ÿrst non-trivial construction uses polynomials (non-symmetric) in two variables, and can be considered as an extension of the optimal DMRA-code in Section 3.1.
Let S = GF(q) be the set of source states. We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code as follows. 1. Key distribution: the TA randomly chooses two matrices A;B ∈(GF(q)) (w+1)×(w+t+1) , and constructs two polynomials, F(x; y) and G(x; y), F(x; y) = (1; x; : : : ; x w )A(1; y; : : : ; y w+t ) T ;
G(x; y) = (1; x; : : : ; x w )B(1; y; : : : ; y w+t ) T :
Then he chooses n distinct numbers a i ∈ GF(q) and another n distinct numbers b i ∈ GF(q) and announces (a i ; b i ) as P i 's identity information. For each i; 16i6n, the TA privately sends two pairs of polynomials (F(x; a i ); G(x; a i )) and (F(b i ; y); G(b i ; y)) to P i . This constitutes P i 's secret information. 2. Broadcast: If P i wants to authenticate a message s i ∈ GF(q), P i calculates the polynomial U i (x) = F(x; a i ) + s i G(x; a i ) and broadcasts (i; s i ; U i (x)). 3. Veriÿcation: P j can verify the authenticity of (i; s i ; U i (x)) by calculating the polynomial V j (y) = F(b j ; y) + s i G(b j ; y) and accepting (i; s i ; U i (x)) as authentic and being sent from
Theorem 4.1. The above construction results in a (w; n) tDMRA-code C = (S; E; {A i ; E i } 16i6n ); in which the probability of success for a collusion of up to w users in performing impersonation or substitution attack on any other pair of users is at most 1=q. The construction has the following parameters:
Proof. Assume that {P 1 ; : : : ; P w } is the colluder set. We need to consider the following types of attacks: (1) Without seeing any communication, the colluders construct a fraudulent message (i; s i ; A i (x)) such that P j would accept it as authentic and sent from P i . (2) After seeing t broadcasted messages, (i ' ; s i ' ; U i ' (x)), ' = 1; : : : ; t, from users P i1 ; : : : ; P it , the colluders {P 1 ; : : : ; P w } will have one of the following substitution attacks. (2a) For some i ' , say i 1 , the colluders generate a message (i 1 ; s i1 ; U i1 (x)), where s i1 = s i1 such that P j , for some j ∈ {1; : : : ; n}\{1; : : : ; w}, accepts it as authentic and sent from P i . (2b) The colluders construct a message (i ; s; U i (x)), where i = ∈ {i 1 ; : : : ; i t } and s may or may not be in {s i1 ; : : : ; s it }, such that P j , j ∈ {1; : : : ; n}\{1; : : : ; w}, accepts it as authentic and sent from P i . We only give a proof sketch for (2b) and note that the other two cases can be proved in a similar way. In (2b), the colluders construct a fraudulent message (s; a i ; A i (x)) aimed at P j . They succeed if they can correctly guess F(b j ; a i ) + sG(b j ; a i ). Now for any given s , let s ∈ GF(q) and 1 + ss = 0. Consider the two polynomials
It is easy to verify that for all i, 16i6w, we have and for any s i ' ∈ GF(q), F(x; a i ' ) + s i ' G(x; a i ' ) = F r (x; a i ' ) + s i ' G r (x; a i ' ).
This means that the colluders had the same information from their secret and the observed messages, if the TA had chosen F r (x; y) and G r (x; y) instead of F(x; y) and G(x; y). Now it can be veriÿed that F(b j ; a i ) + sG(b j ; a i ) = F r (b j ; a i ) + sG r (b j ; a i ) if and only if r = 0. Since r is an arbitrary element of GF(q), and di erent r give di erent F r (b j ; a i ) + sG r (b j ; a i ), this implies that the success probability is 1=q.
Comparing this construction with the trivial construction 2, shows a marked improvement in e ciency. In particular, if n independent copies of the optimal MRA-codes based on the polynomial scheme [11] is used, we will have a (w; n) t DMRA-code C = (S; E; {M i ; E i } 16i6n ) with parameters |E| = q (((w+1)w)=2+n) , |E i | = q 2(n−1+w) and |A i | = q w+1 . This means that the key lengths for the TA and users are O(n log q). Thus, when n is much larger than t; the key storage of above construction is signiÿcantly reduced from the trivial solution.
A general construction from perfect hash families
In the following we give a general construction for tDMRA-codes by combining an A-code and a perfect hash family.
Perfect hash families
Perfect hash families (PHF) originally arose as part of compiler design -see [21] for a summary of the early results in this area. They have applications in numerous areas of computer science such as operating systems, language translation systems, and information retrieval systems -see [10] for a survey of recent results. PHF have also been used in cryptographic applications such as broadcast encryption systems [15] , secret sharing schemes [6] , and threshold cryptography [5] .
A (n; m; w)-perfect hash family is a set of functions F such that for each f ∈ F, f : {1; : : : ; n} → {1; : : : ; m} and for any X ⊆{1; : : : ; n} such that |X | = w, there exists at least a function f X ∈ F such that f X is an injection on X , i.e. the restriction of f X to X is one-to-one. For a subset X , if the restriction of a function f to X is one-to-one, then we call f perfect on X . We will use the notation PHF(N ; n; m; w) for a (n; m; w) perfect hash family with |F| = N .
Let C 0 = (S; E 0 ; A 0 ) be a Cartesian A-code with deception probability P D 6 , and assume F = {f 1 ; : : : ; f N } be a PHF(N ; n; n 0 ; w + t + 2) from {1; : : : ; n} to {1; : : : ; n 0 }. We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code C = (S; E; {A j ; E j } 16j6n ) as follows. with entries g ' u;v ∈ E 0 , for all 16'6N and 16u; v6n 0 . For each i, 16i6n, the TA generates the key e i for P i as a collection of N matrices each with a single non-zero row and a single non-zero column given by,
and securely sends e i to P i . That is, the secret key of P i consists of the f ' (i)th column and the f ' (i)th row of matrix G ' , for all 16'6N . 2. Broadcast: If P i wants to authenticate a message s i ∈ S, P i generates his authenticator a i for s i by
. . . Theorem 4.2. Suppose there exists a Cartesian A-code C 0 = (S; E 0 ; A 0 ) with deception probability P D 6 , and a PHF(N ; n; n 0 ; t + w +2). Then the above construction results in a (w; n) tDMRA-code C = (S; E; {A j ; E j } 16j6n ) with deception probability P * D 6 . Various parameters of the tDMRA-code C satisfy
Proof. Without loss of the generality, we assume that w colluders P 1 ; : : : ; P w , after observing t broadcasted messages from t users, P w+1 ; : : : ; P t+w , want to perform an attack on a pair of users P i and P j . That is, the colluders want to generate a message (i; s i ; a i ) such that P j will accept it as an authenticated message from P i . There are four cases to be considered. Case 1: P i ; P j ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }; Case 2: P i ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }, but P j = ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }; Case 3: P i = ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }, but P j ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }; Case 4: P i ; P j ∈ {P w+1 ; : : : ; P w+t }. Let L = {1; : : : ; w + t; i; j} ⊆{1; : : : ; n}. Then |L| = w + t + 2. There exists a f ' ∈ F such that f ' is one-to-one on L. Consider the 'th component keys of P 1 ; : : : ; P t ; P t+1 ; : : : ; P w+t ; P i ; P j , obtained from matrix G ' . Clearly, P 1 ; : : : ; P w , pooling their (row and column) keys, have no information about g ' f ' (j);f ' (i) , so the probability that P 1 ; : : : ; P w can correctly generate the partial authenticator g
where P I and P S denote the deception probability of impersonation and substitution attacks in the underlying A-code C = (S; E 0 ; A 0 ), respectively. Remarks 1. In the above construction, we can slightly improve the key length of the users and the length of the authenticator. Observe that for each 16i6n, P i has the partial keys g ' f ' (i);f ' (i) , which is used to generate 'partial' authenticator that can be veriÿed by P j , or to verify the authenticity of 'partial' authenticator sent from P j , when and only when f ' (i) = f ' (j). However, if f ' (i) = f ' (j), then P i and P j will have the same 'th component row and column keys derived from the matrix G ' . So P i can use his 'th component column key to verify the 'th component of the authenticator sent by P j . A similar argument applies to P j for verifying the authenticity of a message received from P i . Thus we can remove the 'partial' key g without reducing the security of the scheme, except that the veriÿcation of the broadcasted messages will use some column keys. In this case, we can save N log |E 0 | bits for each user's key and N log |A 0 | bits for each broadcast message. 2. The construction also results in a (w ; n) t DMRA-code if w + t = w + t. In other words, there is a trade-o between the number of senders and the number of malicious users the system can tolerate. 3. For a given set of parameters, w; t and n, and a given A-code the e ciency of the scheme is completely determined by N , the size of perfect hash family F. Let N (n; m; w) denote the minimum value of N for which a PHF(N ; n; m; w) exists. Thus we will be interested in perfect hash families with small N (n; m; w) for given n; m and w. In particular, we are interested in the behavior of N (n; m; w) as a function of n, when m and w are ÿxed. It is proved in [21] that for ÿxed m and w, N (n; m; w) is (log n), however, the proof is non-constructive and PHF that achieve this asymptotic bound are believed to be di cult to construct. (f(n) = (log n) means that there exist constants c 1 , c 2 and n 0 such that for n¿n 0 , c 1 log n6f(n)6c 2 log n.) In [1, 9] some constructions with reasonable asymptotic performance are given. For example, for ÿxed m and w, N is a polynomial function of log n. Various other bounds on N (n; m; w) can be found in [21, 1, 10, 5] . The basic idea behind the above construction is to use N copies of a (w; n 0 ) tDMRAcode with small n 0 , to construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code with large n, using a PHF with suitable parameters. In the above construction the (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code is obtained through the trivial construction 2, that is, using n 0 copies of an MRA-code. This MRAcode is obtained from the 'synthesis' of an A-code and a trivial cover-free family [25] . In general, one can use any other (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code in conjunction with the PHF to obtain a tDMRA-code for larger number of users. Assume that there is a (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code C = (S; E; {A i ; E i } 16i6n0 ), and there exists a PHF(N ; n; n 0 ; t + w + 2), F. We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code C * = (S; E * ; {A * i ; E * i } 16i6n ) as follows. 1. Key distribution: Consider the perfect hash family F = {f 1 ; : : : ; f N }. The TA randomly and independently chooses N keys e 1 ; : : : ; e N ∈ E and calculates n 0 keys e t 1 ; : : : ; e t n0 , for users. To each user P i , 16i6n, in the 'resulting' code C * , the TA gives the key and broadcasts (i; s i ; a * i ). 3. Veriÿcation: User P j can verify the authenticity of (i; s i ; a * i ) because each subkey e u fu(j) , 16u6N of P j , is the key for the underlying (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code C and allows him to verify the authenticity of a * i , because each component of a * i is one of the authenticators of the (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code with respect to the column keys e 1 ; : : : ; e N ∈ E. Using an argument identical to Theorem 4.2, the following result can be proved. Theorem 4.3. Suppose there exists a Cartesian (w; n 0 ) tDMRA-code C = (S; E; {A i ; E i } 16i6n0 ) with deception probability P D 6 , and a PHF(N ; n; n 0 ; t+w+2). Then there exists a (w; n) tDMRA-code C * = (S; E * ; {A * j ; E * j } 16j6n ) with deception probability P * D 6 . Various parameters of C * are
A secure dynamic conference system
To show the usefulness of group authentication systems we will use DMRA-codes to construct a secure dynamic conference system. By 'dynamic' we mean that conferences are not predetermined and a conference can be held among any c members of the group. By 'secure' we mean (1) a member of the conference can send a message to all other conference members such that collusion of up to w users, not in the conference, cannot learn anything about the message, and (2) collusion of up to w members of the conference (insiders) cannot substitute a broadcasted message with a fraudulent one. We note that constructing a dynamic conference scheme that guarantees privacy of communication among conferences immediately follows from the construction of a key-distribution scheme for a dynamic conference. A key-distribution scheme provides a shared key among all conferences which can be used to encrypt messages. However an encrypted message can be easily substituted by a malicious user of the conference as the key information is shared among members of the conference, and so there is no assurance about the authenticity of communicated messages. In the following we give a construction of a secure dynamic conference system that uses a key-distribution system proposed by Blundo et al. [8] (BDHKVY for short) and ensures secrecy and authenticity of communication.
Key-distribution systems: A Key-distribution system (KDS) is one of the main primitives for distributing keys in networks [30] . In a KDS, the collection of all subsets of n users is divided into privileged subsets and forbidden subsets. To each privileged subset, G, of users a secret key, k G , is attached. k G is computable by each member of G and collusion of members of a forbidden set F, disjoint from G, cannot learn anything about k G . A TA generates and distributes secret key information to all users. If privileged sets are c-subsets of P, and forbidden sets are all w-subsets of P, we use the notation (c; w) KDS. For example, a (2; w)-KDS is a KDS where there is a key associated with each pair of users and no key k {i; j} can be computed by collusion of any w users that is disjoint from {i; j}. A (c; w) KDS is also called a key-distribution system for dynamic conferences. A naive approach to constructing a (c; w) KDS will result in prohibitive cost of key generation and distribution. This can be easily seen by noting that in a simplistic solution each of the ( n w ) subsets of users can be given a distinct key and so the key storage for each user is exponential in w and is impractical for large n. BDHKVY proposed a (c; w)-KDS in which the users' and the TA's key storages are of size ( c+w−1 c−1 ) log q and ( c+w c ) log q , respectively. These are the minimum possible storage requirements [8] .
BDHKVY (c; w)-KDS:
Recall that a polynomial P(x 1 ; : : : ; x c ) = 06j1;:::;jc6w a j1;:::;jc (
where a j1; :::; jc ∈ GF(q), is said to be symmetric if P(x 1 ; : : : ; x c ) = P(x (1) ; : : : ; x (c) )
for any permutation : {1; 2; : : : ; c} → {1; 2; : : : ; c}. BDHKVY scheme consists of the following phases. 1. The TA randomly chooses a symmetric polynomial P(x 1 ; : : : ; x c ) in c variables with coe cients in GF(q); q¿n, and of degree at most w. 2. The TA gives the polynomial f i (x 2 ; : : : ; x c ) = P(i; x 2 ; : : : ; x c ); obtained by evaluating P(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x c ) at x 1 = i; to P i , for 16i6n.
3. If users P j1 ; : : : ; P jc want to set up a common (conference) key then each user P ji evaluates f ji (x 2 ; : : : ; x c ) at (x 2 ; : : : ; x c ) = (j 1 ; : : : ; j i−1 ; j i+1 ; : : : ; j c ): 4. The common (conference) key for users P j1 ; : : : ; P jc is equal to k j1; :::; jc = P( j 1 ; : : : ; j c ): When c = 2, BDHKVY scheme is the same as Blom's scheme [7] .
Securing communication in a dynamic conference system
Given a (c; w)-KDS, we can construct a broadcast encryption system in the following way. Assume that the TA wants to securely send a message s ∈ GF(q) to a group of users P j1 ; : : : ; P jc ; or else one of the users, P j1 , wants to securely send s to other users in {P j2 ; : : : ; P jc }. The TA or P j1 may encrypt s as b = s + k j1; :::; jc and broadcast b. Then any user in {P j1 ; : : : ; P jc } can decrypt b and obtain s, by using s = b − k j1; :::; jc , while any group of at most w users that are disjoint from {P j1 ; : : : ; P jc } have no information about s.
However, the above communication is not authenticated and the origin of a broadcasted message cannot be determined and hence there is no accountability in the system. In the following we show how to add authenticity to this system without requiring more key bits. 1. Key distribution: We start with a BDHKVY (c; w)-KDS, and assume the TA has randomly chosen a symmetric polynomial P(x 1 ; : : : ; x c ) in c variables and of degree at most w, and has privately transmitted P(i; x 2 ; : : : ; x c ) to user P i . The ÿeld GF(q) is chosen such that q¿ max{|S|; n+2( n c )+c−2}, where S is the set of source states. We associate a number N j1; :::; jc to each group of users of size c, {P j1 ; : : : ; P jc }, such that n¡N j1; :::; jc 62( n c ) and if {P j1 ; : : : ; P jc } = {P j 1 ; : : : ; P j c } then |N j1; :::; jc − N j 1 ;:::;j c |¿2. The numbers N j1;:::;jc will serve as identity information for conferences and are made public. 2. Broadcast: Assume that P j1 wants to encrypt a message s ∈ S and broadcast it such that each user in {P j2 ; : : : ; P jc } can decrypt the message and verify its authenticity. (a) P j1 constructs two polynomials, of degree at most w, F j1 (x 2 ) = f j1 (x 2 ; N j1;:::;jc ; : : : ; N j1;:::;jc + c − 2); G j1 (x 2 ) = f j1 (x 2 ; N j1;:::;jc + 1; : : : ; N j1;:::;jt + c − 1):
(b) P j1 encrypts s with the (conference) key k j1; :::; jc and obtains b = s + k j1; :::; jc . (c) P j1 computes the polynomial A j1 (x 2 ) = F j1 (x 2 ) + bG j1 (x 2 ) of degree at most w, and broadcasts ( j 1 ; b; A j1 (x 2 )). 3. Decryption and veriÿcation: A user P ji in {P j2 ; : : : ; P jc } can decrypt and verify the authenticity of a message broadcasted by P j1 . First, P ji calculates polynomial A ji (x 2 ) = F ji (x 2 ) + bG ji (x 2 ) then he veriÿes if A ji ( j 1 ) = A j1 ( j i ) holds and if true, accepts the broadcasted codeword as authentic and sent from P j1 . Finally P ji decrypts b by s = b − k j1; :::; jc to get s.
Theorem 5.1. For c¿2; the above construction provides privacy and authenticity of communication.
Proof. From [8] , we know that the scheme is a (c; w)-KDS. We need to show that it also provides the authenticity for the broadcasted message. It is easy to see that P(x 1 ; x 2 ; N j1; :::; jc ; : : : ; N j1; :::; jc + c − 2) and P(x 1 ; x 2 ; N j1; :::; jc + 1; : : : ; N j1; :::; jc + c − 1), are symmetric polynomial in two variables of degree at most w. Because of the properties of BDHKVY scheme [8] , any colluding set of up to w users in {P 1 ; : : : ; P n } which is disjoint form {P j1 ; P ji } has no information about k j1; ji; Nj 1 ; :::; jc ;:::;Nj 1 ; :::; jc +c−2 and k j1; ji; Nj 1 ; :::; jc +1;:::;Nj 1 ; :::; jc +c−1 . This is the key information used for authentication between P j1 and P ji . Using the optimal DMRA-code described in Section 3, we know that the messages are authenticated.
We note the following. 1. If |S|¿(n + 2 n c + c − 2), the key storage of the above scheme is the same as the broadcast encryption scheme based on the BDHKVY KDS. 2. In the above construction we assumed the message was broadcasted from one of the users in a privileged group. We can slightly modify the construction to allow the encrypted message to be broadcasted by the TA. This can be achieved by including a dummy user for the TA and constructing a (c + 1; w)-KDS. The rest of the construction will be similar to above. 3. We have assumed the same level of protection for secrecy and authenticity. In general we can have w 1 as the biggest size of colluding outsiders (not members of the conference) and w 2 (6w 1 ) as the biggest size of colluding insiders.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied broadcast authentication systems. We argued that DMRAcodes are the basic primitive for providing authentication in groups and gave two constructions, an optimal one and a second one with exibility that is required for practical applications. Although both constructions assume only one message sent by a sender, but it is not di cult to extend them to multiple messages from the same sender. When multiple messages are from di erent senders, a new type of attack must be considered. The aim of the attack is to tamper with the original information of a broadcasted message. Protection against this kind of attack implies that each user must have individual key information and so key-distribution systems that establish a shared key among users cannot be directly used for group authentication systems.
Computationally secure tDMRA-codes
The computational model used for assessing security of tDMRA-codes in this paper has been unconditional. Although unconditionally secure schemes o er the highest possible security level but their key requirements are usually large and so are of little practical application. In practice, data integrity is obtained by using MACs and signature schemes, corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric key systems. The two approaches both provide computational security but have di erent and complementary applications. The main di erences between the two are with regard to the key requirements and computational speed. MACs require shared keys and can be made very fast while digital signatures are asymmetric primitives and are computationally expensive. MACs can be seen as the computationally secure version of A-codes. Numerous constructions for MACs exist. MACs can be constructed from block cipher systems (for example, DES) in CBC mode, or using cryptographic hash functions like MD5 and SHA-1. MACs with provable security can be obtained through Wegman-Carter construction [32] and its extensions [3] .
A very important aspect of 'synthesis' constructions for MRA, DMRA and tDMRAcode is that they can be employed with MACs instead of A-codes. Each 'synthesis' construction essentially combines an A-code with a combinatorial structure: a coverfree family, a KDP or a PHF. By replacing the A-code with a MAC, a system (MRA, DMRA and tDMRA-code) with computational security is obtained such that the security can be directly related to the security of the underlying MAC and parameters of the combinatorial structure. A complete security evaluation of the resulting system requires careful modeling of possible attacks and a formal deÿnition of security and so is beyond the scope of this paper.
Using universality of 'synthesis' constructions makes it also possible to construct e cient systems for large groups through recursive constructions using PHFs.
Open problems
The question of optimality of tDMRA-code is only answered when t = 1. Deriving information theoretic and combinatorial bounds for general tDMRA-codes, and constructing optimal tDMRA-systems are interesting open problems.
We noted that 'synthesis' construction can be used for computational model of security. Formal deÿnition of security in this model and proving security of these constructions with respect to the model will be important extension of this work.
